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Domesticating Data: Socio-Legal Perspectives on Smart 
Homes and Good Data Design 
Martin Flintham, Murray Goulden, Dominic Price, 
Lachlan Urquhart 
Introduction 
In 2012, a New York Times story on the most banal of subjects - store card data - went viral. An 
American man, it was claimed, had discovered that his daughter was pregnant after a retail store 
began targeting the family with pregnancy-related products. The retail store had inferred the 
pregnancy through purchase patterns in the family’s store card data. The algorithms knew before the 
girl’s family did. 
This story has commonly been read as a lesson in the power of Big Data to reveal our most intimate 
secrets. We see it as something different: a warning of a future in which the Internet of Things (IoT) 
creates torrents of group data that overwhelm the efforts of group members to manage the 
personal information that other members have access to. We call this group data interpersonal 
data1, because it is drawn from, and carries consequences for, the relationships between intimate 
groups like the family above. Public discussions around the ethics of data have, to date, 
overwhelmingly focused upon what institutions - state or corporate - know about individuals. We do 
not deny the importance of this framing, but wish to complement it with a focus on what happens 
when data capture is no longer restricted to individuals’ devices, but instead embedded in our social 
environments and involves multiple actors. What does ‘good data’ look like in this space defined by 
interpersonal relations, how good is it really, and how do we avoid it becoming ‘bad data’ through 
inappropriate design, or legal consequence? 
In addressing this question, we focus on the ‘smart home’, as the archetypal group space into which 
the IoT is extending. After introducing the technologies which are currently being designed for this 
space, we turn our attention to how law regulates data in this space (or not). This focus reflects the 
importance of law in shaping the future design of technologies, through concepts like privacy by 
design. But just as importantly, it provides an example of the challenges that external frameworks 
have when engaging with domestic spaces. Our analysis is limited to European Union law, on the 
basis that, as the most proactive regulator in this space, the EU is highlighting the challenges that lie 
ahead for technology designers, and society more broadly. 
We argue the ‘goodness’ of data in the home is strictly contextual. The socially complex nature of the 
domestic space means that, even with best intentions, good applications can result in bad outcomes 
if they do not attend to what users actually want and do in practice. For example, the Samaritans 
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Radar2 app garnered significant criticism by collecting, sharing and drawing attention to Tweets 
labelled as indicative of distress despite aiming to do good by preventing suicide. When designing for 
the home, there is clearly a need to engage with the setting, and actors therein. From the legal 
perspective, whilst GDPR may provide high level requirements and norms, these need to be 
appropriately and carefully situated so as not to become problematic themselves. As Nissenbaum 
has long argued, privacy can be seen as the contextual integrity of information, where harms occur if 
that information moves outside what individuals expect, to unanticipated channels of sharing.3 
Accordingly, within the home, to understand if applications will result in good or bad data they need 
to be designed with an appreciation of the expectations and uses specific to the practice(s) 
implicated by the data. 
Viewed through the prism of interpersonal data, the specific forms of sociality in this space take on 
greater importance for design. Single-occupier homes are becoming more common, yet are still in 
the minority. Most homes are shared spaces, indeed even single-occupier homes may regularly host 
guests that otherwise live elsewhere. Most commonly, this sharing is between family members, 
though this itself is a concept which defies easy categorisation for technical systems. The once 
widespread notion of the family as a nuclear unit, clearly structured according to its social functions, 
and distinct from wider kin and community,4 has little support today amongst those that study it. 
Instead, drawing on empirical study, family is seen as diverse, fluid and dynamic.5,6 Defining what 
family is has accordingly become far less deterministic, based not on any applied template, but 
rather on doings7 - in other words, the shared practices of members who identify as family. The 
notion of family and the experience of it are then co-producing. Families may fit the nuclear 
template, but they may also be made up of cohabiting couples, those ‘living apart but together’, they 
may be gay or lesbian. Agency in families is unevenly distributed, often along lines of generation and 
gender, but the specifics of the distribution are situated in the particular instance in question. In 
some cases, this distribution is so uneven it becomes coercive, and members subject to violence at 
the hands of other family members.8 In their totality, these characteristics are deeply challenging for 
technological systems that rely on the application of machine-readable formal structures for their 
operations. 
To explore what the outcomes of these technical and legal developments might mean for the home, 
we engage in design fiction. Design is commonly concerned with solving problems. Design fiction 
uses the same design practices but for asking questions instead. Through several short narratives, 
our design fiction seeks to show how the smart home might provoke unconsidered, problematic or 
unexpected data practices within the smart home. We draw on these to conclude with reflections on 
the specific but complex challenges that designers and participants of this new world face in trying to 
design good data practice, or at least in avoiding the bad. 
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The Smart Home 
The smart home marks a coordinated industry programme to bring IoT technologies, and the 
associated service platforms to which they connect, into the home. Smart devices span heating, 
security, entertainment, lighting and appliances, but the vanguard has proved to be the smart 
speaker. In 2017 it was predicted that smart speakers will be installed in over 60 million homes by 
the end of 20189, by summer 2018 it was predicted they would be in 100m homes10. Currently these 
devices’ adoption is geographically limited to the most lucrative and accessible markets - Amazon’s 
Alexa for example was, as of 2017, only available in English, German and Japanese (Google’s offering 
covered an additional four languages). Their availability can be expected to expand greatly in the 
next five years however - whilst Apple lags in smart home offerings, it’s voice assistant already covers 
21 languages. In regards to data, the application of pervasive computing to such shared 
environments presents a qualitatively different set of challenges from designing discrete computing 
technologies for individual users, as the industry has done in the four decades since the computer 
was reconfigured as personal. In the existing era of personal devices, the challenge has been one of 
protecting personal data from ‘bad actors’ - third parties who would exploit that data for their own 
gain. The standard defence has been to secure such data behind a user account, gated by biometric 
data or a password, leaving the data only accessible to the user and the service provider. 
In recent years this challenge has become increasingly fraught. First, a procession of large-scale hacks 
weakened the notion that user data was secure from third parties. The consequences of these hacks 
ranged from the inconvenience of required password changes, to credit card fraud, to - at least in 
the case of the Ashley Madison hack11 - at least two suicides. More recently, the focus has turned 
away from third party interventions, to the intentions of the service providers themselves. At the 
time of writing the likes of Facebook and Google are facing intense pressure from the public, media 
and regulators over their own gathering and use of personal data. 
In the coming era of the IoT the challenges posed by personal data collection remain, but are joined 
by those of interpersonal data. Data collected from, and actuated by, pervasive computing in the 
environments around us implicates not only the individual user of a device, but the multiple users of 
the space. In smart homes, as our focus is here, these multiple users have existing relationships, as 
families; flatmates; host-guests; owner-pets. Here the elegance of the secured user account solution 
breaks down. This approach is predicated upon the uncontroversial identification of data subject, 
which is to say the data collected from a device logged into a specific user account is assumed to 
belong to that user, and hence accessible to them alone. 
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In practice, within intimate settings this is already more complex than is acknowledged. The 
introduction of ‘incognito’ or ‘private’ browsing windows12 is in part a reflection of the recognition 
that in settings like homes, devices are often shared, and that some users may wish to hide parts of 
their browsing history from subsequent users. Such a solution is problematic in that it requires the 
user remember to select the option every time they wish to avoid the risk of ‘social surveillance’.13 In 
the context of IoT it becomes even more problematic, because data collection is no longer so 
obviously tied to specific practices (e.g. browsing on a shared laptop), but is embedded in the world 
around us, potentially tracking us through every waking, and sleeping, moment. Temporarily ‘opting-
out’ of tracking becomes unviable. 
The specific danger here is not some distant bad actor accessing personal data, but rather its 
exposure to those closest to us. Our intimates may know more of our secrets than anyone else, but 
what we hide from them is that which is most potentially consequential. When people are asked 
about breaches of their privacy, it is not abstract third parties that concern them the most, but those 
they know best.14,15 This appears born out by the suicides which followed the Ashley Madison hack, 
which revealed infidelity, or attempted infidelity, to users’ loved ones. It is the potential breach of 
the trust held between these closest ties, and the consequences of such breaches, that makes such 
data exposure so troublesome. 
The IoT raises questions of how such interpersonal data should be secured, but also how it should be 
used, for the use of data often entails exposure of it in some form. The content recommendation 
systems of video-on-demand services like Amazon Video, for example, reveal in their suggestions the 
type of content previously consumed. If, for example, a user had a preference for erotic content, this 
will be apparent on subsequent visits to the site by other members of the household. 
Amazon is also the creator of Echo, which, along with Google’s Home, has become front runner in 
the smart home market. Echo and Home have established their respective parent companies as the 
default platform providers in the smart home. Increasingly, other companies are integrating their 
devices into one or both platforms. As such, Amazon and Google find themselves at the sharp end of 
the question of how best to manage interpersonal data. Their response has been Amazon Household 
and Google Families. These are a set of interlinked user accounts with prescribed relationships - 
specific adult, teen and child arrangements - through which the smart home and its data are to be 
managed. In doing so, they create what we refer to as ‘platform families’16 - domestic kinship groups 
which are constituted within proprietary digital systems. 
At root, these interlinked accounts comprise of taxonomies defining relationships between different 
users, devices, and services. Amazon separates Household into three roles: Adults (18-), Teens (13-
17), Children (-12). Google Families also consist of three roles, but these are Parents, Family 
Members, and Family Manager. Household allows for ten members - two Adults, four Teens, four 
Children; Families allows for six. Children/Family Member accounts allow for only limited agency, 
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16 (Goulden forthcoming) 
and Adults/Parents can set limits on what media and services they can access, and when. Amazon’s 
Teen accounts do not have these constraints, and can make purchases through Amazon using the 
family payment option, but orders must be reviewed by an Adult before they can be executed. 
Google’s Family Manager role, alongside parental controls, also has executive functions including 
“Decide who is in the family group”, and “Delete the family group”. Then there are the restrictions, 
for example Families’ members must all reside in the same country, and can only be a member of 
one family at a time. Household defines Adults as over 18, except in Japan where they are over 20, 
because this is the age at which Japanese can hold a credit card. These taxonomies, including the 
relationships they encode, and the limitations placed around them, are the result of a set of 
culturally, commercially and legally informed choices by designers - about what family looks like - 
and as such are inherently ethical acts.17  
Whilst seeking to manage the challenges of interpersonal data, the deployment of tools such as 
Families and Household do much more. By intervening in both the information available between 
members, and the agency and accountability members hold over smart devices in the home, and by 
extension other users of those devices, they mark a radical intervention into domestic life, seeking to 
digitise domestic interpersonal relations. In doing so, they demonstrate how IoT technologies carry 
novel implications for interpersonal relations, and the data generated around them. This is the 
context in which data will be evaluated as ‘good’, or otherwise. 
Legal Perspectives on Interpersonal Data & Smart Homes 
Domestic IoT technologies, and the platform families they establish, intervene in a space that, 
historically, law has been reticent to enter. Data protection law provide rights for individuals over 
their own data but deal less effectively with group or collective rights.18 Furthermore, human rights 
law has long recognised a right to private and family life, and any limitations on privacy need to be 
proportionate, necessary and legally justified, showing the value placed on keeping the home free 
from external privacy intrusions.19,20,21 Similarly, EU data protection laws exempt data processing 
carried out by individuals during purely household or personal activities,22 meaning they are not 
classified as ‘data controllers’ with the responsibilities that come with it. However, the growth of 
smart homes as ad-hoc collections of smart devices is complicating this, with case law that narrows 
this exemption and bringing data protection law into the home, and reframing family dynamics by 
potentially forcing members into managing their legal obligations internally.23,24 
In this section, we consider a number of questions that are raised when we apply current data 
protection law to smart home environments. However, like with technology, law can be a blunt 
instrument as it needs to be contextualised. Given the focus on regulation through technology design 
in the GDPR, the way legal requirements are built into technology need to account for the context of 
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use and needs of users better, particularly in the home. At one more technical level, actually 
embedding legal principles into technology is complex due to the importance of interpretation and 
law being language based, requiring translation and assumptions about meaning of terms: 
something that is technically difficult to account for. At another, targeting the designers and 
developers of IoT to support their understanding and engagement with legal requirements has its 
own problems around comprehension and accessibility of language.25 However, even if these 
challenges could be addressed, the variety of deployment settings for these technologies mean 
challenges will arise that were not foreseen during the design stage. Regulation through design may 
have good intentions to address the lag between legal regulation and technological innovation, but it 
needs to attend to the way these systems are used in practice too. In homes, this could mean making 
a system too transparent where inferences about daily life are made trackable and visible to co-
habitants, leading to social surveillance. Or perhaps setting up accounts where permissions over data 
processing prevent control by some household members, despite data being co-constructed and 
interpersonal.  As the law normally does not go into this space, the appropriate responses remain to 
be seen, but it is important to consider in more detail some of the challenges below, in order to open 
up the problem space. 
Who owns interpersonal data, what are their rights, and who is responsible for 
fulfilling them? 
Even if members seek to exercise legal rights over interpersonal data, because such data does not 
relate to just one individual, understanding to what extent new individual data rights in Europe for 
GDPR apply is problematic. Rights to data portability26 or to be forgotten27 are already technically 
complex to exercise, but when data relates not just to one person, but to many, it adds another layer 
of difficulty. With the right to data portability, for example, it applies to raw data, but not any 
statistical inferences or analysis made, perhaps to provide personalisation. Thus if someone leaves 
the family home, they may not have a right to the personalisation of the home’s devices, such as the 
smart thermostat’s heating profile which is tailored to their activities. 
A related challenge is determining who the rights may be exercised against. Smart home 
technologies create opacity around data flows, coupled with a complex ecosystem of stakeholders 
seeking access to the data. This is legally challenging, as accountability is often lacking.2829 There are 
difficulties establishing who is legally responsible, and who users need to contact to exercise their 
rights. As mentioned above, by bringing IoT devices into the home, there is increasing volume of 
domestic personal data processing ongoing, which threatens the household exemption. This may 
give rise to a new class of ‘domestic personal data controllers’ (DPDC) who might need to respond to 
right to be forgotten claims for smart fridge consumption by family friends or to create consent 
notices for babysitters captured on their Nest cams. 
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There is a tension in how they might reconcile their social obligations, as members of the household, 
with legalistic requirements of responding to rights requests. As gatekeepers to the home, DPDCs are 
also mediating data flows internally and externally. Given the current business model, data on Nest 
Cam or a fridge does not stay within the confines of the home, it travels to the cloud. This is 
particularly problematic for interpersonal data, as unlike within individual personal data that is 
wholly within the realm of GDPR, the law is not as clear on protection of co-constructed data or even 
group privacy as a whole. 
This poses issues for the family unit in smart homes, especially over time. Navigating what rights 
individuals have and against whom becomes a complex exercise. Can children apply for subject 
access requests for data processing to their parents? Can family visitors demand a right to be 
forgotten when they leave the home? These challenges are exacerbated when family dynamics are 
tested by disruption (break-ups, divorce, domestic violence etc). How do DPDCs manage these issues 
if they are proximate to data subjects? They may find themselves having to balance legal 
responsibilities against the normative expectations attached to their roles within the family unit, 
potentially having to choose between risking censure from either the law or their loved ones. 
Who can access the data? 
Often with IoT, to be more legally compliant, trustworthy & responsible, the proposed solution is to 
increase transparency and accountability around data flows to end users.30 The smart home is no 
exception, however, how accountability is managed needs to account for the domestic order. 
Disclosure of information within relationships may cause harm, especially during times of disruption. 
Information collection is fractured and distributed across smart home devices. How and if this 
information is presented to different family members can impact relationships and even lead to 
privacy harms, as in the example we began this chapter with. Given many IoT services are mediated 
by contracts and accounts, family members beyond the lead account holder may have limited rights. 
If privacy harms occur to spouses, partners or children through information sharing, they may have 
no recourse as they are not account holders. 
Design Fictions - Domestic Data, Good and Bad 
Design fiction is the practice of exploring possible futures by creating speculative and provocative 
fictional narratives. Here we use design fiction to create scenarios around data in the home which 
integrate legal, sociological and IT perspectives, and these help us both to understand what it will be 
like to live with future technologies, but also to think more carefully about that future.31 
Bad Data 
Fiction 1: For that Special Someone 
Susan and Bill Anderson live with their children Josh and Angela. They have recently signed up for the 
FutureHome Smart Ecosystem™. This package interconnects practically all electronic devices in the 
home, from appliances like the TV and the oven down to electric toothbrushes. It also includes home 
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security devices like internal and external cameras. In order to save money on the installation, the 
family sign up for the AdConnect package. This package is billed as a “data-driven brand loyalty 
discount package”: by sharing their data and delegating some control of the smart home to third 
parties, significant savings can be made on the package price.  
AdConnect™ utilises interpersonal advertising, algorithmically combining user preference data with 
data on family relationship and events. When, on the eve of Bill’s birthday, the family is targeted 
with ads promoting vouchers for a seedy motel on the edge of town, the kids see mum get really 
mad and shout at dad a lot. As the AdConnect™ package stipulates a minimum spend for all family 
occasions, dad still gets a present, but Angela notices he doesn’t look that happy about the 
PieceOfMind™ location tracker that mum says he will have on him the whole time from now on. 
Fiction 2: Watching Me Watching You 
John and Mary are an estranged couple with three kids. Several months ago, John moved out of the 
family home where Mary and the children still live. The house was bought new three years ago with 
a full complement of smart devices. It still has 25 years on the mortgage. John, Mary and the children 
are all registered to a Kinship™ group account on the platform that controls the smart house. It was 
John that set up the group account originally, and his remains the admin account. As such he has 
executive control over the both home devices, and user privileges.  
One evening in his rented flat John notices the Ironman film he was planning to watch has already 
been viewed. Mary would normally never choose to watch action films. John starts monitoring the 
devices in the house, noting when Mary turns the lights off at night, uses the shower, has the oven 
turned on long enough that John figures she must be cooking for someone else. He remembers the 
doorbell has a video camera feed, and starts watching it on his laptop when he gets in from work. 
The next Sunday when he picks up the kids from Mary he asks her why the electric toothbrush was 
used twice the night before. Mary tells him to leave. The next day she speaks to her lawyer, but she 
says as John is still paying half the mortgage he has a case for continuing to control the Kinship™ 
account. Instead she has an idea. On Wednesday morning, John receives a letter. Inside is a Subject 
Access Request - as Data Controller, he has 72 hours to catalogue all data he is holding on Susan. 
Failure to comply with the request in the inventory format could result in a fine of €20m or 4% of his 
global annual turnover, whichever is the greater. John calls his lawyer. 
Fiction 3: Equality in the Eyes of the IoT 
A legal case comes before the Supreme Court, concerning the abuse of smart home data during a 
family breakup. The Court creates new case law in its finding that the admin account holder is indeed 
a data controller, and thus under the terms of the GDPR is liable for sizeable fines. Furthermore, the 
co-defendant, Kinship™ LLC, is also found guilty of selling software that was judged to be non-
compliant.  
Even as Kinship™ lawyers prepare an appeal, the company stock price tanks, as does those of its 
competitors. Within days, software updates to smart homes are being issued which attempt to head 
off further legal action. Families across the continent wake to find that all members of the family 
have been granted equal status by the digital systems running the home. The continuing operation of 
all smart devices in the home now requires the consent of all family members. The manufacturers 
believe that this requirement gives their systems the utmost compatibility with legal requirements.  
For the Anderson family parents, life suddenly becomes more a lot more complicated. Angela and 
Josh quickly realise their new found powers. Josh manages to get them off school for a whole 
morning, just by refusing to accept the Terms and Conditions of the front door’s smart lock. Angela 
discovers the Restricted section of mum’s video library, and learns a great deal from it. She does 
worry about getting caught by one of her parents coming home early, but the risk is lowered by the 
fact that she can now access dad’s PieceOfMind tracker, and see where he is at all times. All in all, 
the kids are very pleased with their newfound privileges.  
Good Data 
Fiction 4: Smart Home Truths 
Sam and Leslie have just moved in together. Leslie loves new tech, and has already outfitted the 
house with the latest IoT gadgets and smart control system. In order to fully use the integrated 
system each occupant needs to be registered as a user in the system although basic functionality, 
such as changing TV channels and switching on and off lights, is still available to an unregistered user. 
Leslie fails to register Sam as a user, always seeming to not get round to doing it. A year later, the 
system still only recognises Sam as a “guest”, not a partner. 
Sam can’t seem to get on with the smart home. Leslie has to choose the music to play as only official 
family members have access to the house’s media library. Other things keep happening. Sometimes 
the smart shower switches to cold when Sam is using it and refuses to alter temperature, or the 
washing machine somehow uses the wrong profile and ruins Sam’s delicate clothing. Leslie tells Sam 
that it’s all in their head, and that they are fantasizing that they’re being persecuted by the smart 
home.  
When Leslie’s out at work, Sam’s old friend Alex stops by for a long overdue cup of tea, and a tearful 
Sam confesses that they feel they’re losing the plot. Alex thinks something sounds very wrong, and 
convinces Sam to request a SafePersonalDataAudit from the smart home company. She does so by 
using utility bills and government records to evidence her membership of the home. The audit 
exhaustively logs every action Leslie has taken on the system, revealing a campaign of control and 
coercion, effectively weaponizing the smart home against Sam. Sam packs a bag. The doorbell 
camera glares balefully as Sam and Alex depart. 
Fiction 5: Machine Learning Magic 
Susan and Bill Anderson are having marital problems. Having come to suspect Bill of having an affair, 
Susan has grown distant. Their sex life is almost non-existent, and Susan has turned to online 
pornography as a means of finding satisfaction. Bill has noticed his wife’s distance but finds himself 
unable to initiate a conversation about it, fearful about where it might lead. Each carries on going 
through the motions, unable or unwilling to address the dark cloud hanging over them. 
Part of the Anderson’s installed FutureHome Smart Ecosystem™ is an inbuilt recommender system - 
Synygy™. Unlike traditional systems designed around individual users (inevitably resulting in parents 
being pestered with recommendations for their kids’ favourite cartoons), Synygy is designed to not 
only recognise multiple users, but to use machine learning to identify from their individual 
preferences, content that would appeal to any subset of them, if and when they sit down to watch 
together. 
Bill and Susan often spend some time after the children have gone to bed in the living room, 
watching television - it's a way of being together without actually having to talk. At first, some of 
Synygy’s suggestions make Susan uncomfortable, because they clearly drawn on some of her viewing 
habits which she wishes to keep private. However, Synygy promotes the inclusion of ‘wildcard’ 
content into its suggestions, and is explicit to users that is it doing so - without identifying which 
recommendations specifically. Susan knows full well that its suggestion of Visit from the Plumber 
Vol.III isn’t a wildcard, but it is easy enough to confirm Bill’s belief that it is. They share a rare joke 
about how stupid this recommender systems are. 
Drawing on their full viewing profiles, their demographics, and fine-grained data on daily routines as 
captured by Smart Ecosystem, and combining it with its full user base datasets, Synygy begins to 
suggest both romantic films and films that reflect the Anderson’s current domestic turbulence. The 
shared experiences that follow generate some uncomfortable moments on the Anderson sofa, but 
over the weeks Bill and Susan begin to talk, properly, for the first time in months. 
What Makes Good Domestic Data, Good? 
The rise of the Internet of Things marks the latest chapter in Weiser’s32 ubiquitous computing vision 
of the “disappearing computer”. Formerly innocuous devices such as toothbrushes, thermostats, 
televisions, speakers and even dolls33 are now imbued with so-called “smart” functionality, 
ostensibly harnessing the power of the digital but more specifically the “good” that can be leveraged 
from reasoning about data at scale to enhance previously mundane household activities and to 
enable new experiences. Furthermore, while previously operating as a collection of disparate 
artefacts, the voice interfaces of Google Home and Amazon Echo seek to make sense of, unify and 
integrate this ecosystem of devices into an ad-hoc infrastructure for the modern smart home. The 
end-game of this trajectory is currently uncertain. In the above we have used design fiction to 
explore possible future interactions between social, legal and technical systems in this place; three 
we have labelled as ‘bad data’; two ‘good’. However, even within these short scenarios the picture is 
more complicated. We argue that the data itself in these fictions is agnostic, and is only meaningful 
when considered in a broader socio-legal-technical context. Our goal with the Fictions was not to 
present answers, but to open up questions. 
Our data fictions are deliberately playful, but all are plausible. Fiction 1 demonstrates how the most 
ostensibly mundane of data implicitly has the potential to be momentous because, when it comes to 
data about the situated arrangements of tight-knit groups, meaning is in the eye of the beholder. 
What may appear in one domestic context unremarkable may in another be revelatory, and vice 
versa.34 This Fiction also highlights how data itself does not have to be exposed to be consequential, 
instead here it is the output of algorithmically-processed data which is read as being revealing of 
moral impropriety. This scenario points at the commercial imperatives that are often at play here, 
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which can drive the generation of potentially revealing interpersonal data. Interest in such 
possibilities has already been shown - Facebook announced, in 2017, that it was going to begin to 
enable the targeting of advertising at family groups35. There are potentially considerable conflicts 
between the commercial interests of industry, and those of smart home occupants, and a real 
danger that careless, or simply short-termist approaches to developing the smart home ultimately 
result in the kind of toxicity which has now surrounded Facebook, in the form of fake news and the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal, during 2017-18. We must hope that the technology industry learns 
from its current travails, if only for its own long-term self-interest. 
Fiction 2 focuses on how kinship groups’ membership and roles are dynamic, both changing 
gradually with the unfolding of time, but also occasionally in great lurches. This has profound 
implications for the intimate data which accumulates around such relationships, and how control 
over it is maintained.36 Similarly to Fiction 1, it shows how data from the most quotidian of objects - 
like toothbrushes and ovens - can be imbued with critical meaning by users interpreting data through 
the prism of past experience and current belief. The current design of platform families does not 
suggest due care is being exercised here - Amazon Household, for example, allows either Parent to 
remove their partner account from the family, but the agency to do so is reserved solely for those 
who click first - once out, the ejected is powerless to return.  
At the heart of Fiction 3 is the current uncertainty regarding how regulatory frameworks, with their 
household exemptions, will apply to a technology platform that renders the boundaries between 
home and world outside so porous as to be almost meaningless. The absurd outcome of the court 
case points to a very good reason why the law may be reciticent to intervene in the home, namely its 
bluntness as an instrument in comparison to the nuances of situated domestic practices, a challenge 
that faces technology designers too, albeit arguably to a lesser degree. The scenario also flags the 
capacity of these systems, through remote updates, to change form and function literally overnight, 
and how consequential such changes might be37 when the technologies involved are fully embedded 
in domestic life. 
Fiction 4 has similarities to 2, describing an abusive partner denying their victim control over many 
aspects of their shared physical-digital lives, purely by exploiting administrative privileges38. One way 
in which it differs is in how accountability is established between members. In Fiction 2 Mary can 
ultimately use the law to turn the tables on John’s intrusions, but only in a way in which it was not 
intended. In Fiction 4 by contrast Sam is able to access the devices’ logs via a mechanism designed 
for such purposes, by presenting evidence of her occupancy of the home. Users are both empowered 
and marginalised by data, to both positive and negative affect. 
Fiction 5 demonstrates how situated such evaluations of good or bad must be. In contrast to 1, 
where Bill is made accountable by data for his infidelity, the systems here allow those implicated by 
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the exposure of personal data a means of deflecting their accountability. Unlike the advertising 
system which incriminates Bill, Synygy explicitly includes wildcard suggestions, which in this instance 
act as ‘noise’ which Susan can appropriate to hide what she wants to keep hidden. Accountability is 
itself nuanced - whilst we label as good Susan’s avoidance of it, we apply the same label to Leslie’s 
exposure in Fiction 4. This particular distinction hinges on the actions in question, one set - Susan’s - 
which we judged to be personal, the other - Leslie’s - we judged to require disclosure. Our 
justification relies on the impact of Leslie’s actions on Sam, but nevertheless these are normative 
judgements that we make, and must be reflexive of, just as designers should be. 
These Fictions raise difficult moral questions, which the terminology of ‘good’ data invokes. The 
reader might see it as justifiable that Susan’s pornography tastes are hidden, but have little 
sympathy when similar systems reveal Bill’s infidelity. In an intimate space such as the home, 
inevitably smart technologies impinge on normative judgments of behaviour. As Bowker & Star39 
remind us, the decisions of the designs of these systems are always ethical in nature. There is no 
single standardised solution for designing smart domestic technologies, but an awareness of what is 
at stake, and when individual’s right to privacy may conflict with another’s right to know, is 
necessary. In portraying Synygy’s recommendations altering Susan and Bill’s relationship, Fiction 5 
also poses a question of political philosophy. How should we think about such systems using use 
algorithmic processing to change our behaviour? Synygy is not directed by a human designer to 
rescue their marriage, but here the algorithms’ goal of getting them to watch content has that effect. 
Does the fact that the outcome could be considered positive make this unambiguously good data? Is 
the fact that it is unintentional rather than by design important - would the alternative be creepily 
paternalistic? Does our response change if the algorithm has negative impacts on users - as many 
systems have been shown to?40 
Conclusion 
With little regulatory oversight, the technology industry has propelled societies towards a 
ubiquitous, ‘smart’ future, one that was barely conceivable at the turn of the millennium. However, 
the wholesale application of these technologies in disciplinary isolation may lead to unforeseen 
social impacts, both good and bad, or more likely impossibly difficult to characterise so simply, but 
potentially risking very real harms. The IoT-enabled home industry is built upon but also hopelessly 
addicted to data, and the distributed nature of ambient data collection means there that we are 
quickly becoming surrounded by digital ears. There are many concerns to be raised about how the 
companies which own those ears are monetising what they hear, whether that be Amazon selling 
transcripts of our conversations with Alexa41 or Roomba selling the floor plans of our homes42. Here 
though our focus has been on the dangers of interpersonal data. We would argue that data is 
agnostic, that it is neither good nor bad – but rather that the Internet of Things enables vastly 
powerful tools that can reason about data created by “the user” but also complicated by, as we have 
seen, data about others. Activities in the home are inextricably linked with the activities of other 
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family members, and this is a point we believe is largely overlooked by the current crop of smart 
devices. Whether considering the commercial interests of the technology company seeking a 
foothold into the domestic space through data analysis at scale, or the privacy of the teenage 
daughter’s purchases via the shared Amazon account, these data driven technologies must respect 
interpersonal relationships, and the distribution of agency amongst them, both socially and legally. 
They must also, in doing so, recognise the moral choices they are making in involving themselves in 
these spaces, and redefining their possibilities. 
Information privacy law traditionally stops at the front-door of the home. It is not clear whether data 
protection law provides redress for the actual harms faced by the occupants of the modern smart 
home, or whether it is too far removed from the practical challenges faced by users – however in the 
interim compliance mechanisms like privacy by design43 are bringing it in by the backdoor. If 
technology embeds regulatory norms,44 these can structure relationships in the home. Even if done 
with the best of intentions, these are external interventions into complex, intimate spaces, and the 
consequences of them are difficult to anticipate. The extent to which they are negotiable or legible 
to end users, and compliant with the situated norms of any particular household, will affect their 
impact. A good example is requirements for parents to consent on behalf of under-16s to access 
services like social media or online shopping.45 Depending on family dynamics, such a requirement 
may impact autonomy and agency of young people in negative ways, and neglect developmental 
differences of different users. 
Our conclusion, then, is to suggest that for the Internet of Things and the smart home to be 
considered as “good” – or rather, harmless – in their use of data, they must be grounded in an 
interdisciplinary conversation about the tensions at the intersection of human-computer interaction, 
or increasingly human-data interaction46, the social life of the home and the law. There are 
significant implications for the designers of technologies of the future smart home: 
● The next generation of smart devices should, potentially actively and disruptively, deliver 
data protection norms into the home, perhaps by considering what a meaningful and 
recognisable digital front-door should look like. 
● They must involve their users in a legitimate conversation about the value of their data – not 
just engaging in privacy by design, but affording informed and visible transactions around 
data that can be integrated into the socially negotiated work of the home. 
● Where interpersonal data is concerned, its visibility, and the potential accountabilities that 
flow from that for those implicated by it, requires careful thought on the part of designers. 
Predicting all outcomes is impossible, but certain data, in certain systems, may require the 
maintenance of personal privacy, even where that undermines the possibilities presented by 
merging user data. In other situations, the deliberate, and explicit, insertion of noise into the 
data may offer a solution which mediates between individual and group interests. 
● Technology blunders into ordering the home in different ways. We need to better 
understand the implications of using technology design to bring structural and legal norms 
into the ‘sacred space’ of the home. The smart home should be made configurable, not seek 
                                                 
43 Article 25, General Data Protection Regulation 2016. 
44 Lawrence Lessig, ‘Code v2’, http://codev2.cc/download+remix/Lessig-Codev2.pdf. 
45 Article 8, General Data Protection Regulation 2016. 
46 Richard Mortier, Hamed Haddadi, Tristan Henderson, Derek McAuley and Jon Crowcroft, 'Human-Data 
Interaction: The Human Face of the Data-Driven Society' (October 1, 2014), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2508051 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2508051. 
to configure, the family schema to reflect the complex, fluid and inherently non-standard 
domestic environment. 
Finally, we consider how some of the challenges we have raised can and are beginning to be 
addressed through research and design. 
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), and its focus on user centric design, can address some of these 
regulatory challenges by surfacing social practices and how users orientate around a technology. 
Furthermore, the growing interest in embedding socially desirable values and norms into technology 
is one approach to addressing the risks of bad data. However, in practice, as phenomenologists such 
as Don Ihde have argued for a long time, how a technology is designed and how it is used differ 
considerably.47  
Technologies designed for one purpose can be be repurposed for another. So whilst a smart camera 
entry system can be designed to spot intruders, it can also be used to track movements of a spouse, 
to question on why they are arriving so late. A smart thermostat can be used to help users manage 
energy more efficiently, but it can also be used by social workers to argue a house was too cold, 
showing evidence of neglect of children. A smart fridge can be used to manage consumption of food 
to address waste, but it can also be a trigger for those with eating disorders by questioning their 
consumption practices.  
Many of these technologies assume social harmony within the home, in the same way socio-
technical research in the early years of Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) research 
often assumed harmony between worker and employer when new systems were deployed. As more 
critical school lines of thought emerged, particularly in Scandinavia, this assumption was challenged 
and a more conflict driven model of the setting for technology deployment was given attention. For 
the smart home, the complexity needs attention. The power relationships and domestic hierarchies 
cannot be neglected in design.  
Relatedly, there is a risk in this design space of the assumption that social problems can be fixed by 
technology. Without considering the context of deployment, ostensibly good data applications can 
fall into bad data. Accordingly, the fallacy of a binary good/bad is not productive when designing for 
the home, and arguably for any data driven technology that humans interact with. It neglects the 
subtleties, and how people use and domesticate technologies into their everyday lives.  
Furthermore, with its focus on individual rights, for example in data protection, the law can also 
neglect these subtleties. Data in homes is often co-constructed, yet protection is constrained to 
individualised notions of one user, one device. This is not the case, and whilst the home is posing 
challenges for technology design, equally the law will need to face up to the limitations of not 
attending to the social context of use too. Privacy by design is a good idea in the abstract, but if the 
protections, or understanding of what is needed do not tally with the reality, then these safeguards 
are likely to miss the mark.  
If designers cannot give these questions the attention they require, or resolve them in a way that 
does not place all implicated members interests over primarily commercial interests, the ethical 
choice is to not pursue the smart home at all. 
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